Apparently I am not the only one having problems with Mr. Pinker. In Science and Spirit, Susan Greenfield1 says this in her interview with the editor Chris Floyd (unfortunately there is no date provided with the article):
And there is another, perhaps more serious problem with attempts by Dennett and others to explain consciousness by purely mechanical processes, she says. “The problem is that he tends to conflate mind with consciousness. I think you can talk about mind being something enduring, something that involves the configuration of your brain cell circuitry. But we know that this personalization of the brain can be divorced from consciousness, because you can lose your mind and still be conscious, you can blow your mind and still be conscious. You can also go to sleep and become unconscious, but you haven’t necessarily lost your mind. So I think the two are separate. But as far as I know, Dennett has not really been fierce about those distinctions.”
No, Dennett certainly has not been as fierce as Pinker is now. But this quote shows two interesting things: a) the connection between personal identity, consciousness and the mind and that b) scientists are sometimes so much more philosophical than philosophers themselves…
- Neuroscientist from the University of Oxford: her profile at wikipedia.
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